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United Kingdom (UK) demand for carnations by exporting country was estimated using a production 
version of the Rotterdam model, and model estimates were used to assess the effects of EU preferential 
trade agreements on import demand. Of particular importance was how these agreements affected 
Colombian and Kenyan carnation exports to the UK, the second largest market for Colombian carnations 
and the largest market for Kenyan carnations. Results showed that Colombia benefited from preferential 
access to the UK more so than Kenya: the benefit to Colombia was due to both trade creation and 
diversion, whereas the benefit to Kenya was mostly due to trade diversion. Results further showed that the 
competition between Colombian and Kenyan carnations was insignificant, and there was no evidence that 
the preferences given to Colombia harmed Kenya or vice versa.   
Keywords: Kenya, Colombia, carnations, UK, preferential trade agreements, trade diversion 
 





1.  INTRODUCTION 
The United Kingdom (UK) is the largest importer of carnations in the world. According to the UN, world 
carnation trade was valued at $498 million in 2007 and UK imports were valued at $126 million—25% of 
total world trade that year. The United States was the next largest importer, at $88.9 million. Carnations 
in the UK were mostly sourced from Colombia, Kenya, the Netherlands, and Spain. In 2007, these 
countries represented 90% of total carnation imports in the UK and individually represented 38%, 23%, 
19%, and 10%, respectively (UNCOMTRADE from Developing Countries 2008). From 2001 through 
2004, carnations were the most popular flower in the UK, accounting for 30% of total cut flower demand 
on average. This is in part due to carnations being relatively inexpensive and having a longer vase life 
when compared with other flower species (CBI 2007b). 
Although other UK flower imports are mostly sourced from within the European Union, carnation 
imports are mostly sourced from outside the European Union, where developing countries have become 
increasingly important as import suppliers (Eurostat 2008; CBI 2007b). Carnations in the UK are 
primarily sourced from two developing countries: Colombia and Kenya. Both have emerged as important 
participants in world flower trade and have benefited from nonreciprocal tariff-free access to the 
European Union (Meier 1999; Hughes 2001). Since Colombia has implemented campaigns against drug 
trafficking, her exports qualify for the special Generalized System of Preferences incentive scheme to 
combat drugs (Gallezot 2005; Panagariya 2002). Prior to 2008, Kenya enjoyed open access to the 
European Union under the Lomé Convention (Candau and Jean 2005; Panagariya 2002). Kenya’s access 
has been extended under the current economic partnership agreement (EPA) between the European Union 
and the East African Community (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2007).  
Colombia and Kenya account for 70% of all carnations exported to the UK (Eurostat 2008), and 
the UK is also an important destination market for these two countries. According to the UN, in 2007, 
world trade in Colombian carnations was valued at US$262.2 million, of which the UK was the second 
largest destination market, accounting for 18% of total Colombian sales ($48 million). The United States 
was first at 33% ($87.2 million). For Kenya, the UK is much more important. In 2007, world trade in 
Kenyan carnations was valued at $36.2 million, of which the UK accounted for 79% ($28.8 million). The 
next largest market for Kenyan carnations, the Netherlands, was much smaller by comparison ($3.7 
million; see Table 1). 
Two important issues regarding EU preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and UK carnation 
imports from developing countries are addressed in this study. First, PTAs have likely diverted UK 
imports from the EU countries to the developing countries. UK imports from the Netherlands are 
comprised of both domestic flowers and re-exports from developing countries, whereas imports from 
Spain are domestic production only (Eurostat 2008). Given that increased carnation imports directly from 
developing countries could lead to decreased indirect imports from these countries via European 
intermediaries, which are recorded as intra-EU imports, the increase in imports from Colombia and Kenya 
has probably affected the Netherlands more so than Spain. For instance, there has been increased trade 
through contractual arrangements between Kenyan flower producers and UK supermarket chains, which 
has supplanted trade previously facilitated by European wholesalers and Dutch intermediaries (Barrett et 
al. 1999; Dolan and Humphrey 2004).  
Second, we address the importance of PTAs to Colombia and Kenya through their increased 
exports to the UK. It is likely that carnation exports from Colombia and Kenya have been enhanced by 
tariff-free access to European markets. However, the degree to which developing countries benefit from 
PTAs is not always obvious because the preferences given to one developing country may come at the 
expense of another (Panagariya 2002). Past studies have focused on preference utilization and the impact 
of preferential agreements on aggregate trade, the trade balance, and economic performance of 
developing countries. Our study addresses the sector-specific effects of preferential agreements that are 
the created and diverted trade in a given sector due to PTAs.  
2 
 
Table 1. Colombian and Kenyan carnation exports (US$) by destination market: 2007
a 
Colombia   Kenya 
World $262,183,755    World    $36,226,760   
United States  87,164,885    United Kingdom  28,794,439 
United Kingdom  47,997,239    Netherlands  3,652,283 
Japan 32,236,325    Belgium  2,852,662 
Russia 21,607,748    France  392,542 
Netherlands 20,410,786    Switzerland  342,314 
Spain 19,279,593    Norway  119,199 
Canada 13,358,650    Germany  17,000 
Germany 8,309,000    South  Africa  16,442 
Czech Rep.  2,771,241    Russia  13,811 
Finland 1,845,079    Japan  9,844 
Austria 1,319,842    Czech Rep.  4,281 
Latvia 1,214,148    Hungary 3,000 
France 1,177,627    Poland  2,466 
Slovakia 1,049,351    Italy  2,461 
All Others  2,442,241    All Others  4,016 
Source: UNCOMTRADE 2008 
a The reported data are for all countries that reported imports from Colombia or Kenya. Thus, world estimates may not include all 
destination markets. 
In this study, we estimate the demand for fresh-cut carnations in the UK where carnation imports 
are differentiated by country of origin (Armington 1969). The Armington framework assumes that 
carnations from each of these countries are individual goods that are imperfect substitutes due to country-
of-origin specific factors. Given the role of intermediaries and retailers in the UK carnation trade, imports 
are treated as inputs and a production version of the Rotterdam model is used in demand estimation (Theil 
1980; Laitinen 1980). Sanyal and Jones (1982) note that even when imports are not physically altered 
(e.g., carnations), activities such as handling, insurance, transportation, storing, repackaging, and retailing 
still occur, resulting in a significant amount of domestic value added before final demand delivery. Thus, 
production theory should apply even in the case of carnations, which are mostly imported in final form. 
In treating imports as inputs, we specify and estimate a system of origin-specific conditional 
import demand equations and an unconditional total expenditure function (aggregate import expenditures 
as a function of domestic, import, and resource prices). Given the model estimates, the unconditional 
price effects are derived for each exporting country and are used to estimate the impact of PTAs on 
Colombian and Kenyan carnation exports to the UK, and the trade creation and diversion effects of PTAs 
in the UK carnation market.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview of the 
Colombian and Kenyan cut flower sectors and their preferential arrangements with the European Union. 
An overview of the UK market for fresh-cut flowers with particular focus on carnation imports is also 
provided in this section. In Section 3, the theoretical and empirical models are presented, and in the 
penultimate section, empirical results are given where the unconditional demand elasticities and PTA 





2.  BACKGROUND 
Colombia and Kenya 
Colombia is the first Latin American country to have cultivated cut flowers. Cut flower cultivation began 
in the late 1960s, mainly over the tropical highland area of Sabana de Bogota, where cheap, fertile land 
and labor were available. Colombia’s climate is favorable for year-round production of flowers such as 
carnations and roses, and the location of most production is in proximity to the capital and international 
airport (Madrid and Lovell 2007; Meier 1999).  
Colombian carnations enter the European Union duty-free under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) incentive scheme to encourage sustainable development and good governance in 
developing countries (GSP+). The GSP+ scheme specific to Colombia includes those special 
arrangements given to developing countries that combat drug production and trafficking (European 
Commission 2004). To be eligible, developing countries must implement key international conventions 
on human and labor rights, sustainable development, and good governance. Access to the European 
Union could be denied if found in noncompliance.  
To be eligible for GSP+, a developing country must be classified as “vulnerable.” The vulnerable 
status requires that a country is not classified by the World Bank as a high-income country. Additionally, 
at least 75% percent of a country’s total GSP exports to the European Union must be concentrated within 
five sectors, and a country’s total GSP exports to the European Union must be less than 1% of total EU 
GSP imports from all countries. Thus, an increase in export diversity and activity could result in a loss of 
preferential access. 
GSP+ eligibility is approved for only two years. This requires that developing countries reapply 
and prove compliance every two years. Before 2005, GSP was negotiated every 10 years, and the last 
round of preferential arrangements lasted from 1995 to 2005. In 2005, GSP+ was reauthorized for 2006–
2008 only. In October of 2008, qualifying countries had to reapply for 2009–2011.
1 
The floriculture sector in Kenya has become a major foreign exchange earner due to increased 
exports to European markets. Export revenues from flower production have overtaken coffee and tourism 
and rank second only to tea (EPZA 2005). Kenya is currently the largest exporter of cut flowers to 
Europe, accounting for about 35% of EU flower imports. European countries account for over 90% of 
Kenya’s cut flower exports, with the Netherlands, UK, and Germany accounting for 68%, 19%, and 6% 
respectively (CBI 2005).   
Prior to 2008, Kenya benefited from open, nonreciprocal access under the Lomé Convention 
agreement. In 2008, the nonreciprocal arrangements under Lomé were replaced with reciprocal EPAs in 
2008 (Odhiambo and Sambu 2007; Candau and Jean 2005; Panagariya 2002). Although EPAs required 
African countries to eliminate tariff barriers on EU products, a reprieve on this provision has been 
granted. In November 2007, Kenya and other East African Community (EAC) states signed the 
framework for an interim EU-EAC EPA that allowed for tariff-free access to EU markets for all products 
except rice and sugar. The EAC also secured a 25-year reprieve from full liberalization, which delayed 
the requirement to grant tariff concession to the European Union (Odhiambo and Sambu 2007; Ministry 
of Trade and Industry 2007).  
The United Kingdom 
In 2006, UK cut flower imports were valued at approximately €0.8 billion, accounting for 24% of total 
EU cut flower imports. Comparable EU importers are Germany, the Netherlands, and France, with market 
                                                      
1 All information pertaining to GSP+ was obtained from various documents found at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/cfm/doclib_section.cfm?order=date&sec=160&lev=2&sta=1&en=20. There are 16 GSP+ 
beneficiaries for 2009–2011: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela. The eligibility of El Salvador and Sri Lanka is under 
investigation. Panama was among the beneficiaries in 2006–2008 but did not reapply.  
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shares of 23%, 15%, and 12%, respectively (CB 2007a). Although carnations have been the most 
important flower import, in recent years the range of flower species demanded by UK consumers has 
widened, resulting in carnations accounting for a smaller share of total imports. Interestingly, carnation 
imports from developing countries have increased by 10% per year on average from 2002 to 2006. In 
2000, UK carnation imports from developing countries accounted for 59% of total carnation imports; in 
2006, developing countries accounted for 71% (Figure 1). In 2000, 27.2 million kilograms (kg) of 
carnations were exported to the UK, valued at €115.3 million. This has steadily decreased to 21.9 million 
kg in 2007 (€91.2 million; Figure 2). 
The share of the UK market supplied by Colombia and Kenya, and UK carnation expenditures 
from 2000–2007 are reported in Figure 3. Colombia and Kenya are the primary suppliers of carnations to 
the UK and together have accounted for as little as 46% of the total UK market in 2004, to as high as 67% 
in 2006. For the most part, Colombia’s share of the UK carnation market has been steady at about 40%; 
however, Kenya’s share reached a low of about 4% in 2003 but has steadily increased since then. From 
2004 to 2005, Kenya’s share of the UK market increased from about 6% to nearly 19%, and then 
increased to nearly 29% in 2006. During this period (2004–2006), UK total expenditures on carnations 
also increased (from €82.3 million to €107.9 million). In 2007, however, Kenya’s share of the UK market 
decreased to 23% (Figure 3). Despite the recent growth in carnation imports from Kenya, Colombia 
remains the UK’s leading supplier. In 2000, UK imports of Colombian carnations were 9.1 million kg. In 
2001 and 2002, UK imports from Colombia decreased, making Spain the leading supplier during this 
period. However, since 2003, carnation imports from Colombia rebounded, and Colombia has been the 
UK’s leading supplier ever since (Eurostat 2008). 
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The observed changes in UK carnation imports are associated with the development of 
supermarkets as the main sales channel for carnations. Larger supermarket chains, due to their enormous 
buying power, have directly influenced the way products are sourced. Since supermarkets often prefer to 
source flowers directly from growers, shorter distribution lines are increasing in importance. The share of 
supermarkets is expected to increase, at the cost of traditional retail channels such as florists. The increase 
in supermarket share is mainly explained by the ability of supermarkets to lower profit margins because 
they are often supplied by specialized wholesale companies with their own production in developing 
countries. Florists’ prices tend to be three times higher than supermarkets’, and the price of mail order is 




3.  THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Theoretical Model 
The production version of the Rotterdam model (differential production model), which is derived from 
the differential approach to production theory (Theil 1980; Laitinen 1980), is used in estimating UK 
demand for imported carnations. The consumer-based Rotterdam model has been used more frequently in 
import demand analysis. See Mutondo and Henneberry (2007); Schmitz and Seale (2002); Winters and 
Brenton (1993); and Seale, Sparks, and Buxton (1992) for examples. It should be noted, however, that the 
original “Rotterdam” applications to import demand utilized the differential production model and not the 
more popular consumer-based specification (Clements and Theil 1978; Theil and Clements 1978).
2 As 
mentioned, Sanyal and Jones (1982) noted that given the intermediate nature of traded goods, producer 
theory may be more appropriate for modeling import demand; and even when a traded product is not 
physically altered, activities such as handling, insurance, transportation, storing, repackaging, and 
retailing still occur, resulting in a significant amount of domestic value added when the final product 
reaches the consumer. Recent import demand applications using the differential production model include 
Davis (1997); Washington and Kilmer (2002); Muhammad, Jones, and Hahn (2007); and Muhammad 
(2007). Unless specified, what follows can be attributed to these studies. 
To derive the empirical model, we assume a two-step profit maximization procedure. First, firms 
minimize input expenditures subject to a technology constraint to get the conditional input demands; and 
second, firms maximize profit by varying output to get the output supply. Letting x represent input 
quantity and w represent input price, the conditional demand for the ith input is specified as (Theil 1980, 
p. 35): 
  1
(log ) (log ) ( ) (log )
n
ii i i j i j j
j




Note that  , ij n   where n is the number of inputs in the system. fi is the share of the ith input in total cost 
() ii ii in wx wx
  . i is the marginal share of the ith input in total cost   () / ii ii in wx wx
      
. 
) (log X d  is the Divisia volume input index (Divisia index) where 
(log ) (log ) ii in dX f dx
   and is a 
measure of change in real input expenditures.  is a positive scalar and may be regarded as a measure of 
the curvature of the logarithmic cost function. ij is the ith–jth element of , which is a symmetric 
positive definite matrix where 
1 (1/ ) ( ) 
  Θ FF H F, and  1
n
ij i j  
   , and  1 1
n
i i 
   . F is a 
diagonal matrix with factor shares () i f  along the diagonal, and H is a Hessian matrix of the firm’s 
implicit production function. The elements of H are the second partials with respect to inputs 
(
2 / h    xx). γ is the revenue-cost ratio 
(/ ) ii in pQw x
  .  
Letting Q represent firm output and p the output price, the log differential supply equation is 
expressed as follows (Theil 1980, p. 38): 
 
1









      
. (2) 
                                                      
2
 The theoretical approach is a nonissue when the focus of analysis is the conditional stage of demand because the 
production specification is empirically identical to the consumer specification (Theil 1980). The theoretical approach does matter, 
however, when unconditional estimates are of interest because the unconditional stages are empirically different with each 
approach. Given this distinction, the unconditional estimates could significantly differ between the two approaches (Davis and 
Jensen 1994; Washington and Kilmer 2002).   
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All terms are as previously defined. The relationship between equations (1) and (2) is due to 
changes in total input expenditures (as measured by the Divisia index) being proportional to changes in 
output by the factor γ (Theil 1980, p. 35). This is expressed as follows: 
  (log ) (log ) dXdQ   . (3) 
Model Application to Import Demand 
Following Armington (1969), we assume that carnations from each exporting country are individual 
goods (e.g., Kenyan carnations) that make up the product group carnations, where each country’s export 
is assumed differentiated by country of origin. There are a number of reasons for differentiation of this 
type. Similar products from different sources may be physically different, but more often than not there 
are perceived differences, such as a country’s reputation for quality products, trade history, reliability and 
consistency, and political issues tied to trade that give rise to price differences that are not explained by 
product attributes alone (Blonigen and Wilson 1999; Lopez, Pagoulatos, and Gonzalez 2006; Zhou and 
Novakovic 1996). Firms may view homogeneous products from different countries as differentiated given 
perceptions about exporting counties. For example, the regulatory issues or unreliability of one country 
may result in an importer’s willingness to pay more for the same product from another country. In this 
context, cross-country competitiveness implies that changes in relative prices shift import demand to or 
away from riskier import sources, and the allocation of total imports across countries may be a way to 
minimize import risk (Seo 2001). 
Following Theil and Clements (1978) and Clements and Theil (1978), we also assume that 
carnation imports are intermediate goods weakly separable from domestic inputs such as labor and fuel. 
For convenience, we denote the total number of inputs n, the number individual imports/source countries 
n1, and the number of domestic resources n2, where n = n1+ n2. The weak separability of domestic inputs 
and imports obviates the need to model domestic resource demand as part of the import allocation system. 
We employ this assumption because although resource prices were readily available, industry-specific 
resource quantities were not.  
Given weak separability, the demand for an individual import can be expressed as a function of 





ii t i t i j j t i h h i t
jh
fx X w d

        
. (4) 
Equation (4) is the import allocation model and is the finite version of equation (1) where xi is the 
quantity of the ith import and wj is the jth import price. As suggested by Theil (1980), continuous log 
changes have been replaced with finite log changes where for any x or w, 
1 log( / ) log( ) it it it i x xx d x     and  1 log( / ) log( ) it it it i ww w d w    . 
_
1 0.5( ) it it it f ff   , where  i f  
is the share of the ith import in total import cost 
1
1 1 (; )
n
ii ii i wx wx i n





ti t i t i X fx
     is the 
finite version of the Divisia index and is a measure of aggregated expenditures (in real terms) on imported 
carnations in the UK.  () / ( ) ii ii i i wx wx     is the marginal share of the ith import in total import cost. 
() ij ij i j      
 is the Slutsky price coefficient or conditional import price effect, which measures 
the effect of the jth product price on imports of the ith product. To account for the seasonal variation in 
carnation demand, monthly dummy variables (dh) are included in equation (4), where ih measures the 
impact of seasonality on the demand for the ith import. i, ij and ih are assumed constant for estimation. 
it is a random disturbance term.  
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The import allocation model requires that the following parameter restrictions be met in order to 
conform to theoretical considerations: 
1 i i   , 
0 ij i   , and 
0 ih i    (adding up); 
0 ij j    
(homogeneity);  ij ji   
 (symmetry); and the matrix of conditional price effects [ij] should be negative 
semidefinite (Laitinen 1980). The import allocation model satisfies adding up by construction. We test for 
homogeneity and symmetry using likelihood ratio tests. The negative semidefinite property is confirmed 
when all conditional own-price effects are nonpositive ( 1 0 ii in    ).  
The aggregate import expenditure function is derived from equation (2). Multiplying equation (2) 
by γ and using the relationship in equation (3), the determination of total import expenditures (also in 





ttj j tk k t h h t
jkh
Xp w w d

          
. (5) 
()      ;    1 () jj j n        
; and    2 () kj j n         
. 
Equation (5) states that the total expenditures on imported carnations are a function of the domestic 
carnation price (p), individual import prices (wj), and resource prices (wk). , j, and k are assumed 
constant for estimation. t is a random disturbance term.  
Equations (4) and (5) form a system where (4) is the allocation of real import expenditures across 
exporting sources and (5) is the determination of real import expenditures. Substituting equation (5) for 
the Divisia index term in equation (4), we solve for the unconditional elasticities of demand with respect 























  (7) 
 
j











Equations (6) and (7) are the responsiveness of the ith import to changes in the domestic retail 
price (p) and resource price (wk), respectively. Equation (8) is the responsiveness of the ith import to 
changes in own-price (i = j) or the price of a competing import (i  j).  
Equation (8) is comprised of two effects. The first term ( / ij i f 
) is the indirect or expenditure 
effect of a change in price. The second term ( / ij i f 
 ) is the relative or conditional price effect, that is, 
the effect of a price change holding total expenditures constant. The expenditure effect should be negative 
because  0 j  
 (an increase in import prices should lower total import expenditures) and  0 i    (an 
increase in total import expenditures should increase imported quantities). The relative price effect should 
be positive for cross-products (although not always the case) because a competitive relationship should 
exist for any two imports if total import expenditures are held constant. In a trade policy context, 
/ ij i f 
 is the trade creation effect because it measures the increase in a specific import due to an  
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increase in total expenditures induced by a price decrease.  / ij i f 
 is the trade diversion effect because it 
measures the rate at which any two imports are substituted for one another given a change in their relative 
prices. 
Policy Simulation Procedure 
The chief objective of this study is to simulate the impact of PTAs on UK carnation demand. Following 
Kastens and Brester (1996) and Gustavsen and Rickertsen (2003), origin-specific import demand 
projections are derived using an elasticity-based forecasting equation where the projected quantity of the 








jt jt tt k tk t
it xp xw xw it it








      
              

. (9) 
Equation (9) states that the quantity of the ith import in period t+1 is a function of the quantity 
imported the previous period (t) and the percentage changes in the domestic price, resource prices, and 
origin-specific import prices. Note that the ’s are the unconditional elasticities defined by equations (6) 
through (8). 
  Carnation imports from countries without special agreements are assessed the third 
country duty rate of 12% (Taxation and Customs Union 2008). We apply this tariff rate to carnation 
imports from Colombia and Kenya to asses the impact of PTAs on import demand. At present, no duties 
are imposed on carnations from these countries (Taxation and Customs Union 2008). Thus, the 
percentage change in their import prices due to the tariff should equal the tariff rate,  
  1 ( )/ ( (1.12) )/ 0.12 jt jt jt jt jt jt ww ww w w   
. (10) 
Using equations (8), (9), and (10), and assuming no change in p or wk, the impact of the tariff on 

















 j denotes Colombia (C) and/or Kenya (K) in this instance. Equation (11) gives the impact of a 
change in the jth price on the ith import. The expenditure and relative price effects are the first and second 
terms in brackets, respectively. The first term measures the trade destruction (negative trade creation) 
effect of the tariff, which is the decrease in xi due to a tariff-induced decrease in aggregate expenditures. 
The second term is the trade diversion effect of the tariff, which is the substitution of j for i due to a tariff-
induced increase in the price of j relative to i. We used equation (11) to derive the trade creation and 




4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Data and Estimation Results 
The External Trade Section of the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) provided the 
import data used in this study, which was the harmonized system classification “fresh cut carnations and 
buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or for ornamental purposes.” Monthly data were used for estimation, 
and the time period was from January 2000 to February 2008. Source-specific imported quantities of 
fresh-cut carnations for the UK were measured in units of 100 kg, and values were in euros. Import values 
were on a cost-insurance-freight basis. The exporting countries were Spain, the Netherlands, Kenya, 
Colombia, and the rest of the world (ROW). The ROW was an aggregation of UK imports from non-EU 
countries other than Colombia and Kenya. Given that carnations from Spain and the Netherlands 
accounted for the overwhelming majority of UK imports from EU countries, imports from other EU 
countries were negligible and were excluded from this analysis. Domestic carnations (UK production) 
were also excluded for the same reason.
3  
Import prices were calculated by dividing the value of the commodity by the quantity, which 
resulted in a euro per 100 kg unit of measurement. Given that monthly domestic carnation prices at the 
retail level were not available, the UK consumer price index for garden plants and flowers was used as a 
proxy. Note that carnations account for about 15% of total cut flower imports in the UK, and an even 
smaller percentage of total plant and flower demand. Thus, changes in carnation prices may not be 
completely represented by this index. However, this index does reflect the overall viability of the plant 
and flower sector in the UK, which could affect flower imports overall and carnation imports in 
particular. A wage index for the retail trade sector was used to account for the cost of labor. Both indexes 
were provided by the UK Statistics Authority, Office for National Statistics. Diesel fuel prices in euros 
per liter were used to account for in-country transportation cost and other energy expenses. Fuel prices 
were provided by Eurostat.  
Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 2. The average monthly price of 
Kenyan carnations in the UK was €401.53/kg for the data period January 2006–February 2008. During 
this period Kenyan prices were as high as €603.20/kg and as low as €223.89/kg. UK importers paid about 
€88.00 more for Colombian carnations on average and paid as much as €674.62/kg. During the data 
period, there was little change in the UK plant and flower price index, which ranged from 98.3 to 107.1. 
Fuel prices ranged from €1.05/liter to €1.44/liter, and the wage index ranged from 98.20 to 127.40.   
The import allocation model in equation (4) and total expenditure equation (5) were estimated 
separately using the nonlinear least squares (LSQ) procedure in TSP (Time Series Processor) version 5.0.
4 
This procedure uses the multivariate Gauss-Newton method to estimate the parameters in the system (Hall 
and Cummins 2005). Due to the adding up property, the import allocation system was singular and 
required that an equation be deleted for estimation. The ROW equation was deleted for this purpose; 
however, as shown by Barten (1969), maximum likelihood estimates are invariant to the chosen deleted 
equation. 
Likelihood ratio (LR) tests were used to test for first-order autocorrelated disturbances in 
equations (4) and (5) and the economic properties, homogeneity, and symmetry. The autocorrelation 
parameter in the import allocation system was obtained using the maximum likelihood procedure for 
singular systems found in Beach and MacKinnon (1979). The hypothesis of no autocorrelation was 
rejected at any reasonable significance level in the import allocation system and failed to be rejected in 
the total expenditure equation. The properties of homogeneity and symmetry (given homogeneity) were 
initially rejected at the 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels. Moschini, Moro, and Green (1994) note that the 
                                                      
3 In 2006, UK carnations accounted for less than 0.5% of the total available supply. 
4 Theil (1980, pp. 92–94) shows that if the parameters in equations (4) and (5) are assumed constant and the errors normally 




LR test is biased toward rejection and suggest a correction given by Italianer (1985). This correction 
somewhat improved test results where homogeneity and symmetry failed to be rejected at the 0.01 
significance level; however, both were still rejected at the 0.05 significance level. All results that follow 
have homogeneity and symmetry imposed. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (monthly): January 2006–February 2008 
 Spain  Netherlands  Kenya  Colombia  ROW
† 
Price  (€/100kg)         
Mean 318.93  524.62  401.53  489.83  274.58 
Standard Deviation  92.26  147.53  89.47  77.31  88.11 
Minimum 149.77  92.21  223.89  304.49  116.33 
Maximum 879.56  952.88  603.20  674.62  553.15 
Import quantity (100kg)           
Mean          4,914           2,849         2,658           6,642         2,772  
Standard Deviation          2,736           1,470         1,756           1,422         2,125  
Minimum            782           1,072            339           3,822             20  
Maximum        12,435         12,260         6,548         10,130         9,256  
Import value (€)           
Mean  1,523,870        1,395,701  1,154,383  3,232,261  655,074 
Standard Deviation           912,240           532,771  885,495  806,149  399,669 
Minimum           306,874           542,413  114,106  1,803,969  11,063 
Maximum        4,148,160        3,171,778  3,306,040  5,726,876  1,530,212 
Value share (%)           
Mean 18.95  17.25  13.88  40.85  8.05 
Standard Deviation  10.27  4.84  10.05  8.20  4.65 
Minimum 4.27  8.36  1.44  25.61  0.15 
Maximum 47.66  30.12  38.88  63.75  18.28 
 
Total Expenditure Variables 
UK Price 
(index) 





Mean 101.68  1.25  114.11     
Standard Deviation  2.06  0.10  8.73     
Minimum 98.30  1.05  98.20     
Maximum 107.10  1.44  127.40     
Note
: † ROW is the rest of the world. 
Conditional import demand estimates (marginal share and price coefficients) are presented in 
Table 3. The seasonality estimates can be furnished upon request. Most of the variation in origin-specific 
import demand was explained by the import allocation model. The marginal factor share estimates 
indicated a positive and significant relationship between total import expenditures and origin-specific 
imports. As total import expenditures increased, imports from Colombia had the largest increase (0.349). 
The marginal share estimates for Spain (0.199) and the Netherlands (0.214) were relatively smaller but 
still larger than Kenya (0.171) and the ROW (0.067). The estimates for Colombia and Kenya indicate that 
for every one euro increase in carnation expenditures in the UK, €0.35 is allocated to Colombian 
carnations and €0.17 is allocated to Kenyan carnations. 
The conditional own-price effects were all negative as expected and significant for all countries 
except Kenya. See the diagonal elements in Table 3. Colombia had the largest own-price estimate (-
0.165), which is in part due to Colombia’s accounting for the larger share of the UK carnation market. 
The own-price estimates for the remaining countries were as follows: -0.042 (Spain), -0.093 (the  
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Netherlands), -0.027 (Kenya), and -0.067 (ROW). The conditional cross-price estimates indicated that 
carnations from the Netherlands and Kenya were substitutes (0.026). Colombian carnations were 
substitutes for carnations from the Netherlands (0.054) and the ROW (0.062). No significant relationship 
existed between Spain and the other exporting countries. This confirms what was previously mentioned in 
the introduction, that is, there was no significant competition between Spain and Colombia or Kenya, but 
there was significant competition between the Netherlands and Colombia or Kenya. Thus, a decrease in 
the price of Colombian or Kenyan carnations relative to intra-EU carnation prices would have no affect 
on Spain but would negatively affect carnations from the Netherlands. Interestingly, there was not a 
significant relationship between Colombian and Kenyan carnations, which may be due to contractual 
arrangements between UK importers and developing countries. This is partly reflected in Figure 3, which 
shows that Kenya’s share of the UK market significantly increased while Colombia’s market share 
remained relatively unchanged.  
The cross-price estimates for the Netherlands and the non-EU countries (particularly Kenya) are 
in part due to the decreased use of Dutch intermediaries. Moreover, the replacement of carnations from 
the Netherlands with imports from developing countries may actually reflect the change in the method of 
importing (re-exports through EU intermediaries versus direct imports) more so than origin-specific 
product substitution (Dutch carnations versus Colombian or Kenyan carnations). As carnations from 
developing countries become relatively less expensive, particularly when compared with those received 
by Dutch intermediaries, UK importers may have bypassed Dutch middlemen and purchased directly 
from the developing countries (CBI 2007b). For Spain, the Armington specification (origin-specific 
uniqueness) is more fitting given that its carnation exports to the UK were conditionally unrelated to 
carnations from the other source countries.  
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2 0.68  0.63 0.37 0.81 0.82 
Notes: Homogeneity and symmetry are imposed. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
a Significance level = 0.01; 
b Significance level = 0.05. 
Table 4 presents estimates for the total expenditure equation. To account for domestic price 
expectations, a one-period lag in p was used in estimating equation (5). Here we assume that wholesalers 
procure carnation imports based on the expected returns from domestic sales and not on present domestic 
prices, which could be endogenous. p lagged one-period was used as a proxy for expected domestic 
prices. The domestic price estimate (1.704) was positive, as expected, and significant at the 0.05 level, 
indicating that an increase in the domestic price increased total import expenditures. Although the price of 
fuel and labor had the expected negative signs (-0.560 and -0.491, respectively), neither was significant. 
Although labor was highly insignificant, fuel prices were not (P value = 0.16).  
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Table 4. Total expenditure estimates 
Variable Estimate 
() Domestic price  1.704 (.872)
b 
(πj) Import prices    
Spain  -0.161 (.041)
a 
Netherlands  -0.129 (.035)
a 
Kenya  0.053 (.069) 
Colombia  -0.296 (.119)
b 
ROW  -0.016 (.053) 
(πk) Resource prices     
Fuel -0.560  (.399) 
Labor -0.491  (.919) 
(h) Seasonal Dummies     
January -0.276  (.040)
a 
February 0.187  (.038)
a 
March 0.199  (.034)
a 
April -0.207  (.044)
a 
May 0.042  (.035) 
June -0.183  (.036)
a 
July 0.002  (.039) 
August -0.028  (.039) 
September 0.037  (.034) 
October 0.024  (.034) 
November 0.058  (.035) 
December 0.235  (.038)
a 
Notes: R
2 = 0.79 
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
a Significance level = 0.01; 
b Significance level = 0.05. 
The impact of import prices on total expenditures was negative (as expected) for all exporting 
countries except Kenya and was significant for Spain (-0.160), the Netherlands (-0.129), and Colombia 
(-0.296). Given that Colombia is the UK’s largest supplier, the price of Colombian carnations had the 
largest effect on total import expenditures.  
Unconditional Import Demand Elasticities 
The unconditional import demand elasticities are reported in Table 5. The domestic price elasticities, 
which measure the impact of percentage changes in the domestic price on individual imports, were 
relatively large when compared with the other elasticities. However, none of these elasticities were 
significant at the 5% level; and for the ROW, this elasticity was not significant at the 10% level. With the 
exception of Kenya, the unconditional own-price elasticities were all significant where demand was 
inelastic for each individual product. ROW carnations were the least inelastic (-0.84). The unconditional 
own-price elasticities for the Netherlands and Colombia were relative smaller in absolute value (-0.70 and 
-0.66), but larger than the estimate for Spain (-0.39).  
15 
 
The unconditional cross-price elasticities show that carnations from each country were mostly 
unrelated or substitutes with the exception of the complementary effect of Spain’s price on imports from 
Kenya (-0.22). This is due to carnations from Kenya and Spain being unrelated (conditionally) and the 
significant negative effect of Spain’s price on total import expenditures. Given that total import 
expenditures were statistically invariant to changes in the price of Kenyan carnations, the conditional 
competitive relationship between Kenya and the Netherlands held unconditionally (0.22). This suggests 
that the Netherlands would be the only country to benefit from a tariff on Kenyan carnations. For 
Colombia, the cross-price elasticities were insignificant for all countries except the ROW, where 
Colombia and ROW were both positively affected by each other’s prices. 
















































































Notes: Elasticities are evaluated at mean expenditure shares. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
a Significance level = 0.01; 
b Significance level = 0.05. 
Policy Simulations: The Impact of the 12% Tariff on Colombia and Kenya 
Import demand projections are reported in Table 6 and are based on three policy scenarios: the 
termination of the GSP+ agreement with Colombia, the termination of the EPA with Kenya, and the 
termination of both the GSP+ and EPA. For each scenario, we simply increased the appropriate price(s) 
by 12% and assessed the changes in imports due to trade creation and diversion. UK carnation imports in 
2007 are used as the no-tariff baseline. 
Given the 12% tariff on Colombian carnations, total UK imports decreased by 5,684 hundred kg. 
Results show that Colombia is the primary beneficiary of not being assessed the 12% tariff. UK imports 
from competing countries are also greater without this tariff (ROW is the exception). Since the total price 
effects for Colombia were mostly insignificant, the projected increases for the competing countries in 
Table 6 should not be statistically different from zero. 
Results show that the effect of the PTA between the European Union and Colombia on the UK 
carnation market is mostly trade creation. Note that the increase in total UK imports due to trade creation 
(8,005 hundred kg) outweighed the trade diversion (-2,371 hundred kg). The increase in UK imports from 
Colombia (5,400 hundred kg) is due to both trade creation (2,084 hundred kg) and trade diversion (3,317 
hundred kg), where the trade diversion is primarily the substitution of ROW imports with Colombian 
imports. 
Given the insignificant price elasticities for Kenya, the difference in total UK imports with and 
without the tariff on Kenyan carnations was only 747 hundred kg and is likely not statistically different 
from zero. Additionally, the trade creation projections for all countries are probably not different from 
zero as well. The trade diversion outcome for the Netherlands is the only result that is statistically 
reliable. With that being said, the effect of the PTA between the European Union and Kenya is mostly  
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trade diversion, assuming that the trade creation results are statistically zero. The results show that the 
increase in UK imports from Kenya (752 hundred kg) is mostly due to a decrease in imports from the 
Netherlands (-832 hundred kg). 
Table 6. Impact of the 12% tariff on Colombia and Kenya 
  Quantity (100kg)  Tariff on Colombian carnations 
Country Without  tariff  With  tariff  Difference Trade  creation  Trade  diversion 
Spain 27,087  26,526  561  1,006  -445 
Netherlands 45,534  45,241  293  2,009  -1,716 
Kenya 48,644  47,449  1,195  2,136  -941 
Colombia 68,580  63,180  5,400 2,084  3,317 
ROW 27,861  29,627  -1,766  820  -2,586 
Total   217,706  212,022  5,684  8,055  -2,371 
  Quantity (100kg)  Tariff on Kenyan carnations 
Country Without  tariff  With  tariff  Difference Trade  creation  Trade  diversion 
Spain 27,087  27,220  -133  -179 46 
Netherlands 45,534  46,723  -1,189  -357  -832 
Kenya 48,644  47,892  752  -379  1,131 
Colombia 68,580  69,400  -820  -370  -450 
ROW 27,861  27,218  643  -146  788 
Total 217,706  218,453  -747  -1,430  683 
  Quantity (100kg)  Tariff on Colombian and Kenyan carnations 
Country Without  tariff  With  tariff  Difference Trade  creation  Trade  diversion 
Spain 27,087  26,659  428  827  -399 
Netherlands 45,534  46,430  -896  1,652  -2,548 
Kenya 48,644  46,697  1,947  1,757  190 
Colombia 68,580  63,999  4,581 1,714  2,867 
ROW 27,861  28,984  -1,123  674  -1,798 




5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this study, we estimated the demand for fresh-cut carnations in the UK, where it was assumed that 
carnation imports were differentiated by country of origin. Given the role of intermediaries and retailers 
in the UK carnation trade, imports were treated as inputs and a production version of the Rotterdam 
model was used in demand estimation. In treating imports as such, we specified and estimated a system of 
import demand equations. Estimates were then used to derive the unconditional price effects for each 
exporting country and estimate the trade creation and diversion effects of PTAs in the UK market for 
carnations.  
Results showed that both Colombia and Kenya benefit from their preferential agreements with the 
European Union in the UK carnation market. Colombia benefited more so than Kenya: the benefit to 
Colombia was due to both trade creation and diversion, whereas the benefit to Kenya was mostly due to 
trade diversion. Given the insignificant competition between Colombian and Kenyan carnations, 
projection results provided no evidence that the preferences given to Colombia harmed Kenya or vice 
versa. When the 12% tariff was applied to both countries, the results were similar to the outcome when 
the tariff was applied to Colombia only. This is due to the insignificant impact of Kenya’s price on import 
demand. 
Kenya is clearly better off with the Colombian PTA because of the limited substitutability 
between the two countries and the significant negative relationship between Colombia’s price and total 
UK expenditures on carnations. Spain is better off, or at worst unaffected, by these preferential 
agreements. In contrast, the Netherlands is worse off due to significant competition from Kenya. The 
ROW is also worse off due to significant competition from Colombia.  
Overall, the projections indicated that preferential access for these developing countries is for the 
most part trade creating in the UK carnation market. The competing developing countries (Colombia and 
Kenya) were made better off by their preferential agreements and given Colombia’s importance to the 
UK, Kenya was made better off by Colombia’s having tariff-free access to the European Union. 
Colombia for the most part was unaffected (statistically) by Kenya’s having tariff-free access to the 
European Union. This suggests that exporters in one country should not be concerned with the access 
given to a competing developing country. While this may not be the case for all sectors, this appears to be 
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